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consciousness

is

MCKERROW

—an

by
man,

an inevitable and vmrecognized assumption.

He

unreal appearance

activity of living things.

finds himself conscious as naturally as
It

— suggested
plain

an appearance

is

modes of

the

J. C.

For the

he finds the world external.

only necessary, however, to consider living-activity with

is

sufficient

philosophical innocence to see that consciousness

And

assumption.

once that position

account for the facts of

The value

life

of an assumption

is

is

attained

it

is

not

is

on other and less debatable grounds.
to lay the problems that haunt us, but

the assumption of consciousness raises rich crops of them.

account of

life

only say that
ness,

an

difficult to

My

may
it

be found in the appearance of mind; here I need
dispenses altogether with the notion of conscious-

regarding plants and animals as manifestations of activity

occurring p.ccording to laws which can be formulated in non-subjec-

Whether or not

tive terms.

men and monkeys

it is

an advance,

scientifically, to

regard

as mjiuifestations of activity occurring according

law rather than as conscious subjects acting according to the
own hearts, depends on whether the new
account is more explanatory than the old, whether it solves more
problems than the old, while not raising worse new ones. Emphatically it does not depend on whether we like it or not.
We did not
like being ousted from the central position in the universe we are
not likely to welcome the proposition that, as persons, we do not
to

imaginations of their

;

exist at

all.

If the notion of the conscious subject

sophically,
is

it

is

a mistaken one, philo-

follows that knowledge, as an attribute of the subject,

also illusion, philosophically.

The arguments

Now

of philosophers of

towards scepticism.

this is not

all

But they simply

new

in philosophy.

kinds continually lead them

say,

"But

this leads to scepti-

a
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cism" (lately they say "to pragmatism"; behaviorism has not yet
attained the dignity of being mentioned to be rejected) and forthwith try another Hne. That is to say, the possibiHty of knowledge,
real

knowledge,

is

held by philosophers to be beyond question

sad lack of philosophical

innocence

— presumably

otherwise they would deny themselves. But
familiar parndox

if T

is

it

—

because to do

surely not an un-

suggest that, for a philosopher, to lose his soul,

his subjectivity, is the only

way

to find

it.

Doubtless

hard for a philosopher to give up his knowledge

it is

especially

he has great

;

possessions.

Speculation by no

The

mean

involves a speculator, activity an actor.

increasing insight of science into the activities of nature has

banished the whole cast of dramatis personae

who

played before

But the play goes on. And I may banish
continue to speculate on the nature of things, with-

our primitive ancestors.
myself and

still

out absurdity.
It

is scepticism and his
So far as his pure reason led
he was right but there he went

has been said that Kant's pure reason

practical reason the contradiction of

it.

him towards scepticism, so far
wrong. Having arrived at scepticism, he took it for granted that
the pure reason was not in all cases applicable and thereupon
asserted the authority of the practical reason. This was simply the
;

plain man's prejudice asserting itself

might say,

it

was the old

Adam

;

in the

language of Paul, one

intruding.

Having reached an objective scepticism, Kant should have gone
on to a subjective scepticism. Having proved the impossibility of
knowing anything, he should have wondered whether it was not
because there is no one to know it. But indeed his pure reason had
never been ven,' pure at all. It had not consisted in the banishment
of subjectivity, but in a refinement of that subjectivity, in an attempt
to rationalize

man

a plain

up
is

all

it

while preserving

it.

One can be a philosopher and
The philosopher must give

but not at the same time.

the plain man's prejudices, not only his prejudice that a spade

a spade, but also his prejudice that a person

is

because Kant's dualism of the two kinds of reason
that

it

is

ineffective

;

a person.
is

It is

not complete

one simply sceptical and the other simply and

irrationally contradicting

it.

remind the reader at this point of the manner of mv
approach to the theory of knowledge. T have formed a scientific
hypothesis as to the nature of life, a hypothesis according to which

May

the

I

knowing subject has no other existence than

as a "scientific
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and a mistaken one.
examine the status of what we

object,"

remember

am

that I

me

to

But the reader must

knowledge.

call

not arguing philosophically against the possi-

The hypothesis I assume simply takes its imThe fact that philosophers have been led

of knowledge.

bility

thus becomes incumbent on

It

possibility for granted.

by their reasoning

to scepticism

my

so

is

When

am

I

negative, support for

if

me

what

said ^c see something,

event thus described, according to
in

much,

hypothesis.

my

is

theory?

the nature of the

the occurrence

It is

of a tendency on the occasion of a change in the situation, an

occurrence as necessary as when a chemical reaction responds to a

change

Out of

in its conditions.

our notions of a "per-

this fact arise

son," a "thing" and a relation of the former to the latter of "percep-

The

tion."

thing, as seen,

is

not a real at all;

all

being the "object of perception,"

sists in is in

i.

that
e.,

its

reality con-

the occasion of a

tendency.

Now

in

me

that something presented

is

is

the occurrence of a particu-

in respect

of a change in the situation,

In this case the event

kind of tendency

lar

"my judging

the event be

let

an orange."

the tendency, namely, in this case, to judge "It's an orange," a

tendency as

little

Out of

subjective as the other.

our notions of the thinking subject,

its

this

objects (ideas)

fact arise

and a

rela-

between them variously named. The reality of the concept
"orange" consists in its being the "object of the understanding" and

tion

that

is all its

In particular

reality.

its

reality does not consist in its

That

being representative of a "real" sense-object.

is its

value.

Thus my knowledge, whether "by acquaintance" or "by

descrip-

knowledge by courtesy only.
The illusoriness of knowledge in both kinds has long been recognized.
We need not delay over the case of knowledge by
tion,"

is

acquaintance.

knower,

It

clearly relative to the unique character of the

is

particular morphological character, his

his

anatomy and

Senses and their acuity vary not only from species to

physiology.

species but also within the species.

As

to

knowledge by description, which

tive" intercourse,

that

is

tions.

it

is

responsible for our delusion that
If 1

man

tells

or to have been, what
tion
in

is

mc something and
it

actually

is

we can make
I

And

this

is

true proposi-

understand the fact to be

or was. the function of descrip-

adequately performed, in one sense.

one sense.

arises in "inter-subjec-

a confusion as to the function of description

His proposition is true,
it were, proper func-

the original and, as
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adequate conveyance of the

knowledge of a fact from one person to another. But it is perfectly
clear that the adequacy of the man's speech as an objective descripAs an objective
tion of the fact conveved is quite another thing.
description of the fact his speech might be quite inadequate, untrue,
indeed must be Inadequate, must be untrue. For even though he
were a logician and a scientist, expert in the class of fact at issue,
he could not frame a proposition about it which, as logician, he could
claim to be true. Truth simply does not apply to the case of description of reality.
To think so is like thinking our senses give
us knowledge of the real world.
Our knowledge is necessarily anthropomorphic. The terms in
which we describe the simplest brute fact are human terms. They
are interpretation. We are a juirror up to Nature and our knowledge the reflection therein

—

—

a figure not to be pressed to the ques-

whom? The

world known by acquaintance and
by description, is a '"mental construction" and to know it better is
How
to have more and acuter senses and more adequate concepts.
adequate? Harmonizing with our ethical and aesthetic ideals? With
the rest of our concepts ? With the facts of sense-experience? Harmonizing with the facts. Take care of the pence, says the proverb.
If we take care of the facts, the ethical and aesthetic ideals will take
tion

reflection for

care of themselves.

My own

reading of the facts of

(This does not imply that

it

give an account of spiritual values.)

theory always.

What

chemical activity

much

inanimate

is is life

—manifesting

my own

for

there

life

dispenses with the mind.

dispenses with the spirit;

it

is

able to

—
—a particular kind of physicoMind

itself in its

is

own

away

in

particular ways.

So

explained

concept of the animate world,

\\niat

of the

?

In explaining

away ^lind one explains away Matter,

the object

of sense, as well as Knowledge, the activity, or the product of activ-

But only Matter as the plain man underhad already been done long ago both by philososcientists.
It is generally agreed by philosophers that
the existence of the external world is a matter of faith, not of knowledge and scientists willingly admit that not only do they study
ity,

of the understanding.

and
phers and by
stands

it,

this

;

phenomena merely, but
sists in putting them to

that their verification of their theories con-

the test of sense-experience.

When language first began to be spoken the words used must
have represented sense-objects or events or situations apprehended

;

THE OPEN COURT

354

Yet even then much interpretation must have
much have been taken for granted, the speak-

through the senses.
been impHcit

in speech,

ers themselves for instance, as conscious persons, the reality of their

Space and Time, concepts that were not made explicit anywhere on earth perhaps for millions of years.
But very early also there must have been explicit interpretation.
Men feeling the wind blow postulated a blower, hearing the thunobjects,

This

der, a thunderer.

of science

is

the beginning of science, for the essence

is

hypothesis, the interpretation of fact.

pretation" does not imply that the interpretation

On

such.

"Explicit inter-

was recognized

as

the contrary experience shows that interpretative con-

cepts are very apt to be regarded as having the

same standing

concepts representative of sense-objects or events,

i.

e.,

as

as repre-

phenomenal reality. This is
So much so, that one of
these interpretative concepts, "Mind," is regarded by perhaps the
sentative of "reality," in the sense of

an illusion which

is

still

common

today.

majority of philosophers as the only

The

fact

reality.

are analogous not to

that interpretative concepts

is

objects of sense but to the senses

by which we are aware of objects

they are modes of insight, the senses of the understanding.
concept "atom," for instance, gives us what
insight than

The

we had

we suppose

The

a better

before into the nature of chemical interactions.

interpretative concept

is

a

way

of looking at nature, not the

representative of an actual existent in nature.
It

does not follow, of course, that interpretative concepts neces-

have no potentially sensible counterparts. We may keep an
open mind as to whether potentially sensible atoms do in fact exist.
The planet Neptune was a scientific object which turned out to correspond to an "existent." It became a sense-object. And then interpretation was out of place. We do not interpret objects of sense;
we perceive them and give names to them if we are sufficiently in-

sarily

terested.

The world

is

sensibly appreciated by difYerent species of animals

according to their kind.
that

7ife

appreciate

the world

ways.
ceives

nature

is

Now
it

is

it

more

And we

are not justified in presuming

truly than our fellow-animals.

conceptually appreciated by different
in

more

a sense no

man

is

justified in

truly than another.

The

men

Similarly,
in different

presuming that he con

animistic interpretation of

one mode of conceiving it another mode regards nature
This latter mode is the scientific and its ideal
;

as a field of events.
is

to find uniformity in the

way

events happen and so to state the
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attempts to describe

It

interpretation as possible, while at the

forced ultimately to interpretation by

time

it is

how

events are connected

its

same

passion to explain

for the connections are not revealed to

;

sense.

The

primitive animistic and the

modern

scientific interpretations

And

the latter can hardly be

of nature are both anthropomorphic.

considered truer than the former since the concept of force

is

not

more intelligible than that of God. And if the scientist says that
what he calls the concept force is simply "the way things happen,"
it is open to the primitive man. and the modern theologian, to retort
that that is what he calls God.
Both parties can make their definition less and less anthropomorphic, less transcendent and more immanent, less capricious and more necessary, can in short sophisticate

it

As

ad

I'b.

philosopher, then,

universe.

My

cannot assert anything whatever of the

T

scepticism

complete, since

is

my

incapacity to

know

from the fact that T do not exist, as a knowing subject. T do
not know what "I know" means.
Philosophically. T am simplv a
arises

manifestation of
P)Ut as a plain
a little of the

life.

man, with the plain man's prejudices diluted with

pure reason.

I

venture to believe that there are real

changes, and that they arise in a real external world, not simply in

my body, or in my imagination. This external world appears to
me in phenomena. Tn these phenomena I may find orderliness without limit, but the order

them

no guarantee whatever
of that world may
be as non-existent as purpose in life. This would not imply disorder. It is merely our weakness that supposes the world must be
either orderly or disorderly.
These concepts may be transcended
by the physicist just as those of moral goodness and badness are
transcended in my theory of life.
Order in phenomena implies
necessity.
But it may be that the necessity of phenomenal events
is made up of contingencies, like the necessities of statistics.
And
I find in

of the orderliness of the real world.

a

contingency

made up

itself

may

afifords

The order

be regarded as a necessity,

out of necessities.

The mysteries

is

at

any rate

of physics indeed remind

one of those of theology, how for instance to reconcile God's foreknowledge and man's freedom. And perhaps they are as impossible
to solve, inasmuch as like the latter they are concerned with what
are mere inventions.
"Necessity" and "contingency" are as conceptual as

"God" and "free

will."
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From

the beginning of philosophy the notion of the order of

the universe has been associated with those of

has been analyzed mto them.

It

Time and

thetized into the concept of a world of four dimensions.

world,

it

Space.

Lately these two have been synIn this

seems, events do not happen either necessarily or contin-

gently, thev simply arc.

This appears to be the crowning mercy for Science, considered
as the study, the interpretation, of the order of the

But

world.

"And

it

is

only the order of nature that

.

.

.

phenomenal

thus conceived.

yet." says Professor Eddington. "in regard to the nature of

—

knowledge is only an empty shell a form of symbols.
knowledge of structural form, and not knowledge of content
the mind has but regained from nature that which the minri

things, this
It is

is

has put into nature."

The

^

physicist, like the philosopher, admits

his ignorance of the events that underlie

The
cal truth

epistemology. then, of
is

what works

:

my

phenomena.

theory of

life is simple.

oi theoretical truth there

Space, Time and Crni'itotion

.

p.

200.

is

none.

Practi-

